Abstract. Arguably, ω-regular languages play an important rôle as a specification formalism in many approaches to systems monitoring via runtime verification. However, since their elements are infinite words, not every ω-regular language can sensibly be monitored at runtime when only a finite prefix of a word, modelling the observed system behaviour so far, is available. The monitorability of an ω-regular language, L, is thus a property that holds, if for any finite word u, observed so far, it is possible to add another finite word v, such that uv becomes a "finite witness" wrt. L; that is, for any infinite word w, we have that uvw ∈ L, or for any infinite word w, we have that uvw ∈ L. This notion has been studied in the past by several authors, and it is known that the class of monitorable languages is strictly more expressive than, e.g., the commonly used class of so-called safety languages. But an exact categorisation of monitorable languages has, so far, been missing. Motivated by the use of lineartime temporal logic (LTL) in many approaches to runtime verification, this paper first determines the complexity of the monitorability problem when L is given by an LTL formula. Further, it then shows that this result, in fact, transfers to ω-regular languages in general, i.e., whether they are given by an LTL formula, a nondeterministic Büchi automaton, or even by an ω-regular expression.
Introduction
In a nutshell, the term runtime verification subsumes many techniques that are used for monitoring systems, i.e., for checking their execution as it is happening. Naturally, there exists a variety of different approaches to runtime verification. In this article, we will focus on those which are based on the theory of formal languages, where a so called monitor checks whether or not a consecutive sequence of observed system actions belongs to a formally specified language. For example, if the language comprises all undesired system behaviours, then a positive outcome of this check would normally lead to the raising of an alarm by the monitor, whereas if the language describes a desired system behaviour, the monitor could be switched off.
As a formalism to describe such languages, many runtime verification approaches (cf. [17, 9, 4, 2] ), use linear-time temporal logic (LTL [15] ), whose formulae describe sets (languages) of infinite words (or, ω-languages), meaning that the models of an LTL formula are infinitely long sequences of symbols. The rationale for using LTL to describe properties of systems is that many systems for which formal verification is required (at runtime or off-line) are critical and/or reactive; that is, their failure would have catastrophic impact on its users and/or the environment, and consequently one would like to make assertions about the entire lifespan of such systems, some of which are never switched off, unless they are physically broken and can be replaced in a controlled manner. A typical requirement for such systems, that can also easily be formalised in LTL, would be "the system must never enter a bad state." Although the monitor would require an infinitely long observation to flag satisfaction of the property, it is always able to raise an alarm after finitely many observations, simply due to the fact that a violation of such a property can always be detected in the same instance as the system entering the bad state. Hence, if such a property, formalised as an LTL formula, is monitored, one would expect the monitor to only detect violations. Formal languages which describe properties of this form are therefore referred to as safety languages or safety properties, and they have in common that all sequences of actions that violate them are detectable after finitely many observations. Note that languages belonging to the complementary class of safety properties are known as the co-safety properties, implying that satisfaction (rather than violation) of any such type of property is always detectable by a monitor after finitely many observations, i.e., via a finite "witness."
Since the languages definable by LTL formulae exceed the expressiveness of safety and co-safety languages, a natural question to ask, given an arbitrary LTL formula, is whether or not the given formula is monitorable at all. This is, arguably, an interesting question in its own right, and ideally, we would like to know the answer prior to any attempts of building a monitor, or starting a monitoring process based on an unmonitorable language. Of course, what we then need is a more general notion of monitorability of an LTL formula: Intuitively, we say that the language given by an LTL formula is monitorable if, after any number of observed actions, the monitor is still able to detect the violation or satisfaction of the monitored property, and after at most finitely many additional observations. As an example of a non-monitorable, LTL-definable language consider a property such as "it is always the case that a request will eventually be answered," which is a so called liveness property. For this property no finite witnesses of violation or satisfaction exist, since any finite sequence of actions can be extended to satisfy this property. In order to know that some request is, indeed, never answered, a monitor would therefore require an infinite sequence of actions. In consequence, most examples of liveness properties that can be found in the literature violate the intuitive definition of monitorability given above. To determine whether or not an LTL formula specifies a liveness property is a PSpace-complete problem [23] . However, they are not the only types of properties, which can be formally specified in LTL that are not monitorable, and as this paper will show there exists no criterion that allows to answer the monitorability question for any given formula in a simple, syntactic manner.
Pnueli and Zaks [16] were the first to formalise a notion of monitorability, which matches the intuitive account given above: According to [16] a formula is monitorable wrt. a finite sequence of actions, if that finite sequence can be extended to be a finite witness for violation or satisfaction of that formula. However, Pnueli and Zaks did not address the question of deciding monitorability for a given formula (and sequence). In [2] a slightly more general formalisation based on a 3-valued semantics for LTL is given, such that monitorability of an LTL formula becomes a property of only the formula. Moreover, Falcone et al. [5] have recently shown that the definition given in [2] is, indeed, a generalisation of the one given earlier in [16] , and termed it "classical monitorability." In their paper, they have at first wrongly concluded-but later also corrected [6] -that the class of monitorable languages, under classical monitorability, consists exactly of the obligation properties in the hierarchy of safety-progress properties (cf. [13] ), which is orthogonal to the safety-liveness classification. An obligation property, for example, is obtained by taking a positive Boolean combination of safety and co-safety properties. Despite their correction, Falcone et al. left the question regarding the complexity of monitorability of an LTL formula (or ω-regular language in general) open. Note that [2] did imply a decision procedure based on the construction and subsequent analysis of deterministic monitors for LTL formulae, but the given procedure requires 2ExpSpace (see Sec. 3).
One of the main contributions of this paper is a proof that this upper bound is not optimal, in that monitorability of an LTL formula can be decided in PSpace. In fact, it will show that the monitorability problem of LTL, i.e., the decision problem that asks "is a given LTL formula monitorable?" is PSpace-complete, and that this result even transfers to ω-regular languages in general-regardless as to whether they are given by an LTL formula, a nondeterministic Büchi automaton, or an ω-regular expression. As such it is also proof that no simple syntactic categorisation of monitorability of an LTL formula (or ω-regular language), which could be checked in polynomial time, exists. On the other hand, the result implies that checking monitorability is no more complex than checking safety or co-safety, which have often served as the "monitorable fragment" in the past (cf. [18, 8, 9] ).
As a special case the paper also considers the monitorability problem of Büchi automata, where the automaton in question is deterministic, and shows that this restricted form of the problem is solvable in polynomial time. Finally, it shows that the monitorable ω-languages are closed under the usual Boolean connectives; that is, they are closed under finitary application of union, intersection, and complementation.
Outline. The remainder is structured as follows. The next section recalls some preliminary notions and notations used throughout this paper. Sec. 3 gives a formal account of monitorability of an ω-language and phrases the corresponding decision problem(s). Sec. 4 puts two well-known classifications of ω-regular languages, namely the classification in terms of the safety-progress hierarchy (cf. [13] ) as well as a topological view, in relation with the notion of monitorability. The main contribution of this paper, which makes use of these classifications, can be found in sections 5 and 6 and as such they are also the most technical sections, in that they contain the complexity analyses and proofs of the monitorability problems of ω-regular languages. Sec. 7 details on closure properties of monitorable ω-langues, and Sec. 8 concludes.
by elements from AP . We will therefore use the terms action and state synonymously. The system behaviour which the monitor observes then consists of a sequence of actions. Therefore, we define an alphabet, Σ := 2 AP , and treat consecutive sequences of actions as words over Σ. As is common, we define Σ * as the set of all finite words over Σ, including the empty word, and Σ ω to be the set of infinite words obtained by concatenating an infinite sequence of nonempty words over Σ. Infinite words are of the form w = w 0 w 1 . . . ∈ Σ ω and are usually abbreviated by w, w ′ , and so on, whereas finite words are of the form u = u 0 . . . u n ∈ Σ * and are usually abbreviated by u, u ′ , v, and so on. Let w ∈ Σ ω , then w i denotes the infinite suffix w i w i+1 . . ., whereas u w denotes a prefix of w. u is a proper prefix of w (u ≺ w), if u w and u = w. For any p ∈ AP , and a given σ ∈ Σ, if p ∈ σ holds, we also say that "p holds (or, is true) in the state σ". If p ∈ σ, then "p does not hold (or, is not true) in state σ."
The syntax of LTL formulae, which are given by the set LTL(AP ), is defined as follows:
If the set of atomic propositions is clear from the context, we write LTL instead of LTL(AP ). LTL formulae are interpreted over elements from Σ ω as follows. Let i ∈ N , and ϕ, ψ ∈ LTL, then
Further, we will make use of the usual syntactic sugar such as true ≡ p ∨ ¬p, f alse = ¬true, ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), Fϕ ≡ trueUϕ, and Gϕ ≡ ¬(F¬ϕ).
It is well-known that, for any ϕ ∈ LTL, we can construct a nondeterministic Büchi automaton (NBA), A ϕ = (Σ, Q, Q 0 , δ, F ), where Σ is the alphabet, Q the set of states,
Q the transition relation, and F ⊆ Q a set of final states, such that the accepted language of A ϕ contains exactly all the models of ϕ, i.e., L(A ϕ ) = L(ϕ). If some language of infinite words, called an ω-language, L ⊆ Σ ω is such that there exists an NBA, A, such that L(A) = L, then L is called ω-regular. Obviously, the language specified by an LTL formula is always ω-regular. The size of A ϕ , usually measured wrt. |Q|, is, in the worst-case, exponential wrt. the size of ϕ. For details on the construction as well as further properties of A ϕ , cf. [22] .
When is an ω-language monitorable?
Let us fix an L ⊆ Σ ω for the remainder of this section. In accordance with [16] and [2] , Falcone et al. [5] formally define the monitorability of an ω-language as follows.
Definition 1. L is called
L is positively or negatively determined by uv;
This also lends itself to another, sometimes more intuitive way to think about monitorability of an ω-language, namely in terms of good and bad prefixes.
Definition 2. The set of good and bad prefixes for
For brevity, we also write good(ϕ) (respectively, bad(ϕ)) short for good(L(ϕ)) (respectively, bad(L(ϕ))), and good(A) (respectively, bad(A)) short for good(L(A)) (respectively, bad(L(A))).
In other words, L is not monitorable if there exists a finite word u ∈ Σ * for which we can not find a finite extension v ∈ Σ * , such that uv is either a good or a bad prefix of L. Naturally, given some L, not every finite word is a good or a bad prefix of L, in which case we call such a word undetermined (wrt. L). Let u ∈ Σ * be an undetermined prefix, then, depending on L, the following scenarios are possible: we can find a finite extension v ∈ Σ * , such that uv ∈ good(L), we can find a finite extension v, such that uv ∈ bad(L), or there does not exist a finite extension v, such that uv ∈ good(L) or uv ∈ bad(L) would hold. In [2] , the latter were called "ugly" prefixes, and L "nonmonitorable," if there exists an ugly prefix for it.
Let us now define the monitorability problem of an ω-language as follows.
Definition 3. The monitorability problem for some L is the following decision problem:
When L is given in terms of an LTL formula, an NBA, or an ω-regular expression (which are basically defined like ordinary regular expressions, augmented with an operator for infinite repetition of a regular set, cf. [22] ), we call this problem the monitorability problem of ω-regular languages, or-more specifically-the monitorability problem of LTL/Büchi automata/ω-regular expressions, respectively. One of the main contributions of [2] was a procedure that, given a formula ϕ ∈ LTL, constructs a deterministic finite-state machine (i.e., a monitor for ϕ) whose input is a consecutively growing, finite word u ∈ Σ * , and whose output is ⊤ if u ∈ good(ϕ), ⊥ if u ∈ bad(ϕ), and ? if u is undetermined. Once this monitor is computed, the monitorability of ϕ can be determined in polynomial time, simply by checking if there exists a state whose output is ? with no path leading to a ⊤-or ⊥-state. If such a state, called a ?-trap, exists, then ϕ is not monitorable. Notice, however, that this monitor construction (and this decision procedure) requires 2ExpSpace: as a first step, it creates two NBAs, one which accepts all models of ϕ and one that accepts all counterexamples of ϕ (i.e., all models of ¬ϕ), and then proceeds by examining and transforming the resulting state graphs of these automata. Recall, NBAs accepting the models of an LTL formula are, in the worst case, exponentially larger than the corresponding formula. Since at some point, the two automata are made deterministic, the double exponential "blow up" follows. Moreover, although not explicitly mentioned in [2] , by altering the first step of this procedure, it can be used to decide the monitorability of ω-regular languages, in general, i.e., whether given as an LTL formula, as NBA, or as an ω-regular expression. For example, if instead of a formula, an NBA is given, one has to explicitly complement this automaton, which also involves a worst-case exponential "blow up" wrt. the number of states of the original NBA. However, then the rest of the procedure described in [2] stays the same. On the other hand, if we are given an ω-regular expression instead, we first have to build an NBA, which can occur in polynomial time. Then, in order to get the complementary language, one also needs to complement this automaton. Hence, independent of the concrete representation of an ω-regular language, the construction and subsequent analysis of the corresponding monitor can decide monitorability in 2Ex-pSpace. Therefore, indirectly, [2] shows decidability of the monitorabiliy problem, but whether or not this bound is tight was left open in that paper.
Examples. Let us examine some examples to understand how this construction works and what its outcome is. Fig. 1 depicts some finite state machines (i.e., the monitors) for several LTL formulae, which were automatically generated using the LTL 3 -tools 1 , which are written by the author of this paper and implement the above construction. Each monitor is complete in a sense that for every action from the alphabet, there exists a transition. Note that, although not explicitly marked, the initial state is the top-most ?-state, respectively. Any word u ∈ Σ * which has a corresponding path in a monitor to a ?-state is undetermined wrt. the ω-language being monitored. On the other hand, if u leads to a state labelled ⊤ (respectively, ⊥), then u is a good (respectively, bad) prefix of the ω-language being monitored. It is easy to see, that all the formulae give rise to a monitorable language; that is, from any reachable state in the respective monitor, there always exists a path to a state labelled either ⊤ or ⊥. Let us, therefore, also present a language which is not monitorable and whose (practically not very useful) monitor is depicted in Fig. 2 : Clearly, the right-most state is a ?-trap; that is, once reached by some finite prefix u ∈ Σ * , there exists no extension v ∈ Σ * for u, such that a ⊤-or a ⊥-state can be reached. Or, in other words, every word u = u 0 . . . u n , such that a ∈ u 0 is an ugly prefix of L(a ∧ X(GFb)).
A classification of ω-languages

The safety-liveness view
Alpern and Schneider [1] were the first to give a formal characterisation of ω-languages in terms of safety and liveness properties. This view was subsequently extended to an entire hierarchy of ω-languages, where languages defining safety properties, or their complement are at the bottom (cf. [13] ).
Definition 4. L describes a safety language (also called a safety property), if ∀w ∈
In other words, if L specifies a safety language, then all infinite words w ∈ L, have a bad prefix. On the other hand, if L specifies a co-safety language, then all infinite words w ∈ L, have a good prefix. This also explains why safety and co-safety properties lend themselves so well to runtime verification using monitors: if the specification to be monitored gives rise to a safety language, then all violations of the specification are detectable by the monitor after only finitely many observations of actions emitted by the system under scrutiny. That is, let u ∈ Σ * be a word, resembling the sequence of actions, then either there exists a v ∈ Σ * , such that uv ∈ bad(L), or u ∈ good(L) already holds. On the other hand, if the specification to be monitored gives rise to a co-safety language, then all models of the specification are detectable by the monitor after only finitely many observations 2 . That is, let u ∈ Σ * , then either there exists a v ∈ Σ * , such that uv ∈ good(L), or u ∈ bad(L) already holds. It follows that a co-safety language always has the form BΣ ω , where B ⊆ Σ * . Safety and co-safety are dual in a sense that if L is a safety language, then Σ ω \L, from this point forward also abbreviated as L, is a co-safety language, and vice versa. The following easy to prove proposition makes this duality formal.
Proposition 2. bad(L) = good(L) and bad(L) = good(L).
Definition 5. L describes a liveness language (also called a liveness property) if
In other words, if L specifies a liveness language, then bad(L) = ∅-in which case L may only be monitorable if good(L) = ∅ also holds. The definition of liveness, however, does not require good(L) to be empty or non-empty. Hence, from a runtime verification point of view, many liveness languages which are commonly used to describe system properties in the area of formal verification using, say, temporal logic model checking, turn out to be not monitorable.
Examples. Let us look at some example languages, specified in terms of LTL formulae. The formula ϕ = G¬bad state with bad state ∈ AP formalises, in an abstract manner, the requirement from the introduction: the system must never enter a bad state. In other words, ¬bad state must always be true. It is a safety property as any prefix containing a state in which bad state is true is a bad prefix of ϕ, e.g., u = ∅∅∅∅ . . . {bad state} ∈ bad(ϕ). Naturally, ¬ϕ = ¬(G¬bad state) = Fbad state describes a co-safety property. Any finite word containing a state where the proposition bad state is true is a good prefix for ¬ϕ. In practical terms, this means that a monitor, checking either language will be able to make a conclusive decision after the first occurrence of bad state in the observed sequence of system actions. In fact, we can postulate the following proposition which, using Proposition 2, is easy to prove formally:
Proposition 3. If ϕ specifies a safety or a co-safety language, then ϕ is monitorable.
It is also easy to verify that the formula Fbad state meets the definitions of both cosafety and liveness. However, as we will see, not all co-safety languages are also liveness languages, and vice versa. In fact, unlike Fbad state most liveness languages do not lend themselves to runtime verification via monitors, because they may have neither bad nor good prefixes that would eventually lead a monitor to a conclusive answer. The liveness property given in the introduction, and formalised in LTL as G(request → Fanswer), is such a case. The following proposition is easy to prove: Proposition 4. If ϕ specifies a liveness language, such that good(ϕ) = ∅, then ϕ is not monitorable.
It follows that a formula of the form ϕ = GF(ψ) is not monitorable unless ψ = true or ψ = f alse. In the first case we would get L(ϕ) = Σ ω , and in the latter L(ϕ) = ∅, both of which meet the definition of monitorability. In fact, the languages given by the sets ∅ and Σ ω are both safety and co-safety. As a final example, let us consider obligation languages. In [13] , Manna and Pnueli define the class of obligation languages as follows.
Definition 6. L describes an obligation language (also called an obligation property) if L either consists of an unrestricted Boolean combination of safety languages, or an unrestricted Boolean combination of co-safety languages, or a positive Boolean combination of safety and co-safety languages.
Falcone et al. [6] have shown that
Proposition 5. If ϕ specifies an obligation language, then ϕ is monitorable.
To see that the other direction is not true, consider the counterexample given by the formula in Fig. 1(d) : it does not specify an obligation language, yet it is monitorable.
The corresponding topological view
Alpern and Schneider showed in [1] that
where L S is a safety language, and L L is a liveness language.
Their proof is based on the observation that safety languages (over some alphabet Σ) correspond to closed sets in the Cantor topology over Σ ω (cf. [13] ), and liveness languages to dense sets. It follows that co-safety languages correspond to open sets in that topology. Sets which are both closed and open, are referred to as clopen. It is worth pointing out, and easy to prove, that both ∅ and Σ ω are clopen. Given a set L ⊆ Σ ω and element w ∈ Σ ω , w is a limit point of L, if there exists an infinite sequence of words w 1 , w 2 , . . ., all of which are in L, which converges to w. Clearly, any w ∈ L is a limit point of L, since w, w, . . . converges to w. The topological closure of L, written cl(L), is then defined as the set of all limit points of L. Then, obviously, L ⊆ cl(L).
The following gives a direct definition of cl(L):
From a basic result of topology, a topological closure operator on Σ ω defines a topology, where a set L ⊆ Σ ω is closed (i.e., a safety language) if and only if cl(L) ⊆ L also holds. Moreover, L is dense (i.e., a liveness language), if and only if cl(L) = Σ ω . This alternative classification of ω-languages proved useful as many important results from topology transfer to the commonly used classification in terms of safety and liveness properties. For example, due to Alpern and Schneider [1] it is well-known that the topological closure of a language that is given by an NBA, A, where non-reachable and dead-end states have been eliminated, can be determined by an NBA, A ′ , which is like A except that all states are made final. Now, L(A) gives rise to a safety language if and only if
We will make use of this and similar results in the remainder. For a comprehensive overview on this topology, cf. [1, 13] .
The monitorability problem of LTL
The results of this section will show that the monitorability problem of LTL is PSpacecomplete. In order to show this, we will make use of a well-known construction of a tableau for an LTL formula, which has been given many times before in the literature (cf. [20, 19] ). For reasons of self-containedness, we briefly summarise its most important properties for our purposes.
Let us first fix a formula ϕ ∈ LTL over some alphabet Σ. SF (ϕ) is the set consisting of the subformulae of ϕ or the negations of subformulae of ϕ. A set c ⊆ SF (ϕ)
is complete if the following two conditions are met: 1. Boolean consistency of c; 2. for ϕ ′ = µ ∧ ν ∈ SF (ϕ), ϕ ′ ∈ c if and only if µ ∈ c and ν ∈ c. Let tab(ϕ) = (V, E) be a directed graph, where V is the set of all complete subsets of SF (ϕ), and elements (c, d) ∈ E defined as follows:
-for any ϕ ′ = µUν ∈ SF (ϕ): ϕ ′ ∈ c if and only if ν ∈ c, or µ ∈ c and ϕ ′ ∈ d; -for any ϕ ′ = Xψ ∈ SF (ϕ): ϕ ′ ∈ c if and only if ψ ∈ d.
Let for any c ∈ V , π(c) be the state such that for any atomic proposition p ∈ SF (ϕ), π(c)(p) = true if and only if p ∈ c. An infinite path through tab(ϕ) is called accepting if for every node c on that path with ϕ ′ = µUν ∈ c, either ν ∈ c, or there exists a (not necessarily immediate) successor node d, such that ν ∈ d. For any c ∈ V , we say that c is a good node, if the conjunction of all subformulae in c is satisfiable; otherwise c is called a bad node. Notably, it holds that for any w ∈ Σ ω with the property ∀i ≥ 0. ∃w ′ ∈ Σ ω such that w 0 . . . w i w ′ |= ϕ, there exists an infinite path ρ of good nodes in tab(ϕ) starting from a node that contains ϕ, such that π(ρ) = w. Moreover for ϕ, ψ ∈ LTL, we denote by tab(ϕ) × tab(ψ) the cross-product of the tableaux for ϕ and ψ, respectively.
Lemma 1. Let ϕ not be monitorable. Then there exists a pair of nodes, (q, q
′ ) ∈ tab(ϕ) × tab(¬ϕ), reachable on some u ∈ Σ * and where q, q ′ are conjunctions of subformulae of ϕ, respectively, such that L(q) and L(q ′ ) are dense.
Proof. Following Proposition 1, the non-monitorability of ϕ is defined as follows
In other words, there exists a u ∈ Σ * , such that none of the finite continuations v of u is (i) a bad or (ii) a good prefix of ϕ. Let us fix such a particular u. From the construction of tab(ϕ) it follows that in order for (i) to be true, there must exist a node q ∈ V ϕ , reachable on u (i.e., tab(ϕ) has a path on u), such that ∀v ∈ Σ * . vΣ ω ∩ L(q) = ∅. It is easy to see that L(q) is dense. Requirement (ii), i.e., ∀v ∈ Σ * . uvΣ ω ⊆ L(ϕ), is equivalent to ∀v ∈ Σ * . uv ∈ good(ϕ), which by Proposition 2 is equivalent to ∀v ∈ Σ * . uv ∈ bad(¬ϕ).
Let q ′ ∈ V ¬ϕ be a node in tab(¬ϕ), reached on u. Now, for (1) to be true, ∀v ∈ Σ * . v ∈ bad(q ′ ) must be true, which is equivalent to ∀v ∈ Σ * . vΣ
Since q is reached on u, and by the construction of tab(ϕ) it follows that ∀v ∈ Σ ω . v ∈ bad(L(q)) is equivalent to ∀v ∈ Σ ω . uv ∈ bad(ϕ) (and, accordingly, for q ′ and ¬ϕ). Thus, together with Proposition 2 we get ∃u ∈ Σ * . ∀v ∈ Σ * . uv ∈ bad(ϕ) ∧ uv ∈ good(ϕ), which corresponds to the definition of non-monitorability of ϕ, used in the previous lemma.
⊓ ⊔
Theorem 1. The monitorability problem of LTL is decidable in PSpace.
Proof. By Lemma 1 and 2, ϕ is not monitorable if and only if there exists a word, corresponding to a path through tab(ϕ) × tab(¬ϕ) that contains a pair (q, q ′ ), such that L(q) and L(q ′ ) are dense. As tab(ϕ) and tab(¬ϕ) are of exponential size wrt. |ϕ|, we cannot construct either explicitly. Instead, we will guess, in a step-wise manner, a path through tab(ϕ) × tab(¬ϕ) to some pair (q, q ′ ), and check if both L(q) and L(q ′ ) are dense. To check whether or not an LTL formula specifies a dense set is equivalent to checking whether or not it specifies a liveness language (cf. Sec. 4.2). It follows from Ultes-Nitsche and Wolper's work [23] (Remark 4.3 and Theorem 4.6, if we replace L ω to correspond to Σ ω ) that this problem can be decided in PSpace. So, if the answer to this check is "yes", then ϕ is not monitorable.
Since due to Savitch's theorem we know that NPSpace is equal to PSpace (cf. [14] ), we have thus shown that the "non-monitorability problem of LTL" is in PSpace. However, as PSpace is equal to co-PSpace [14] , it follows that the complementary problem of that, i.e., the monitorability problem of LTL, is, in fact, decidable in PSpace.
Theorem 2. The monitorability problem of LTL is PSpace-complete.
Proof. It is sufficient to show PSpace-hardness. We will reduce the PSpace-complete problem of determining whether or not a formula ϕ ∈ LTL is satisfiable [20] to the monitorability problem of LTL. Let us construct, in constant time, a formula ψ ∈ LT L(AP
, where a ∈ AP , AP ′ := AP ∪ {a ′ } and a ′ ∈ AP . We now claim that ψ is monitorable if and only if L(ϕ) = ∅.
If L(ϕ) = ∅, then ψ ≡ Ga, which can easily be seen monitorable. For the other direction, assume that ψ is monitorable, but that L(ϕ) = ∅. Let Σ ′ := 2 AP ′ and u ∈ (2 AP \{a} ) * . It is easy to see that uΣ ′ω ∩L(Ga) = ∅, but uΣ ′ω ∩L(ψ) = ∅. Hence, for ψ to be monitorable, u has to be extensible with some v ∈ Σ ′ * , such that either uvΣ ′ω ∩ L(GF(a ′ ∧ ϕ)) = ∅, or such that uvΣ ′ω ⊆ L(GF(a ′ ∧ ϕ)). Now, observe that irrespective of our choice of ϕ (including the case ϕ = true), so long as L(ϕ) = ∅, the set L(GF(a ′ ∧ ϕ)) neither has a bad nor a good prefix. This means
The monitorability problem of Büchi automata
Let for the rest of this section A = (Σ, Q, Q 0 , δ, F ) be a fixed NBA with L(A) ⊆ Σ ω . As pointed out in Sec. 4.2, a topologically closed set can be obtained from L(A) via an automaton, referred to as saf e(A), whose accepted ω-language will always be closed, irrespective of L(A). What is more, saf e(A) can be constructed in polynomial time wrt. the size of A. Moreover for the next results, we also need an explicit representation of live(A), whose accepted ω-language will always be dense. Like its counterpart saf e(A), it can be constructed in polynomial time wrt. the size of A. For details on these constructions, see [1, Sec. 4] . Finally, we need to introduce the notion of a tight automaton, as a finite-state acceptor for good prefixes, as follows.
Tight automata
In preparation for the main results of this section, let us discuss how to obtain a tight automaton over Σ * that, given some NBA A, accepts good(A). The construction can be described by a two-stage process.
First, we construct a nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) that accepts the potentially good prefixes of A, where, without loss of generality, all unreachable and dead-end states have been eliminated. From A, we can easily derive the NFA G to some state q ∈ Q and by construction also a (finite) run in A reaching the same q as both automata share the same δ. As by assumption A is non-empty, and all unreachable and dead-end states have been eliminated, it then follows that L(A(q)) = ∅, i.e., ∃w ∈ Σ ω . w ∈ L(A(q)). Moreover, as q was reached on u, it then follows that uw ∈ L(A).
(⊇): Let w ∈ Σ ω be such that there exists an accepting run in A, i.e., w ∈ L(A). As δ is the same for both automata, it follows that there also exists a run on the state space of G ⊓ ⊔ Second, to obtain an NFA that contains only the good prefixes, but no other words, we proceed as follows. As G p A is but an ordinary NFA, we can apply the standard subset construction to obtain a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) accepting the same language, and whose states consist of a subset of states of G p A , respectively. Let G A = (Σ, Q ′ , Q 0 , δ ′ , F ′ ) be this DFA, defined as expected, except that we set the accepting states to be
